
TRI JOKO WALUYO¹ & JAMALUDDIN MD. JAHÌ²
¹ Faculty of Social & Political Science (FISIP)
Universitas Riau
Jln. Prof. Dr. Muchtar Lutfi, Kampus Bina Widya
Pekanbaru 28293, Provinsi Riau, INDONESIA.
E-mail: jokowa66@yahoo.com
² Institute of the Malay World and Civilisation (ATMA)
Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia
43600 UKM, Bangi, Selangor, MALAYSIA.
E-mail: kalimasada78@yahoo.com & jamalmj1949@gmail.com

ABSTRACT

The formal relations of RI-Japan has been opened on 15th April 1958, a while after the agreement value of the peacemant contract and reparations war was changed in Tokyo. The relations of RI-Japan in framework of Indonesian’s expedient to take away the west Irian with violence, and Indonesia got donation from Uni Soviet, Netherlands and Indonesian had ended the problem of West Irian to hand over it to the government of Indonesian on 1st May 1963. Then, International Crisis recently appeared to contradict the formation of Malay Federation, Presiden Sukarno fluented the campaign “Ganyang Malaysia”. Before the problem of Malay was finished, followed the coup d’état which was fluent by Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) on 30th September 1965. This coup d’état ended with failure.

The dualism happened in leadership of President Sukarno and Major General Suharto, as defacto ended after the coming out command letter to take the needed action for saving the revolution, by president Sukarno to Major General Suharto on 11th March 1966. Although at the time, the failure of coup d’état happened and when the dualism of leadership, Japan declarated to sponsor President Sukarno, but didn’t organize any reactions to the failure of President Sukarno which was getting more real except looking after the good relations.

Japan, since got freedom on 28th April 1952, practise did not have turbulence experience in meaning country. Since Prime Minister, Yoshida Shigeru until Prime Minister Sato Eisaku, Japan’s foreign policy followed the United States’ pattern. Japan’s foreign policy to Southeast Asia, was pressed on effort to get the basic commodity and market for the industry. The relations of RI-Japan, for Japan, in framework of the economy, not the ideology. Based on the theory of ‘Nefos-Oldefos’, Japan was more closed with Oldefos, but Indonesian was in Nefos, but the relations of Indonesian-Japan was good and friendly. The good relation of Indonesian-Japan was signed by the enough frequency visit of two states official, the Japan’s implementation of reparations war payment to Indonesia, and Japan’s effort in solving the conflict between Indonesian-Malaysia.

Keywords: war reparations, ideology, friendly
INTRODUCTIONS

The formal relations of Indonesia-Japan has been opened on 15\textsuperscript{th} April 1958. This relation is between two countries that have basic differences, specially in foreign policy implementation; but their relations is based on the agreement of peaceful and war reparations, relative intimate (Abdul Irsan 2007) and the tension hasn’t happened yet. Their relations is colored by implementation of war reparations payment.

According to one side, the relations between Indonesia-Japan is unbalance; in different side, like the relations between USA-Japan. If the relations between USA-Japan, USA gets involved more in Japan’s domestic problems (Nin Bakdi Sumanto dan Bakdi Sumanto 1984); meanwhile the relations between Indonesia-Japan; Japan gets involved more in Indonesia’s problems than Indonesia does. Moreover, it doesn’t mean that Japan has higher level than Indonesian in international relations, because Japan has interest for that. It’s impossible for Japan to ignore for getting attention to the development of the biggest and richest non-communist country in South-east Asia (Robert E. Ward 1967).

THE VISIT EXCHANGE OF JAPAN-INDONESIA’S OFFICIALS

The visit exchange of the government leaders between two countries in international relations is one of the tight sign of their relations. The visit exchange between the senior officials of Japan and Indonesia sometimes is made easier by same problems to be solved and soothe the tensions. Whether the feed-back relations between two countries in unbalance quantity signs top-down position of one nation with another; it hasn’t given yet the answer “yes”; but it’s fact that the visit of Indonesian’s officials to Japan is more often than Japan.

Every Japan’s prime minister since Kishi Nobosuke and every foreign minister since Okazaki (except Shigemitsu, Kosaka, and Miki) have visited Indonesian formally at least once for duty time. Kishi cabinets (1957-1958 and 1958-1960) promoted Japan’s economic recovery and worked to settle reparations with the countries of Southeast Asia (Kishimoto Koichi 1988). The first foreign minister after war who visited Indonesian was Okazaki in 1953 and the first prime minister visited Indonesia was Kishi Nobosuke in 1957 (Masashi Nishihara 1976).
The Japan’s visit to foreign countries is in the framework of industrialization and catching the remainder from the West. When Kishi’s visit to Indonesia in 1957, USA, Canada and West-Europe are still important for Japan than Asia. After 1957, Japan became more enthusiastic in implementing relations with Asia’s countries, and therefore, the Japan’s officials started to make visits. In 1963 and 1967, the Prime Minister Ikeda Hayato and Sato Eisaku did formal visit to Indonesia, Australia and New Zealand.

The visit of Japan’s officials to foreign countries include Indonesia happens short, with tight schedule and is added usually with together communication carefully, in approach effort by the officials of foreign ministry. For the Indonesia’s officials, Japan is considered as advantageous place both for formal visit and informal visit, Tokyo is easy transit place to USA, UN and West-Europe through North-Pole, and even to North Korea. The following table shows the visit quantity between Indonesian’s official to Japan and the other hand between 1957-1966. From this table, in 1958-1964 president Sukarno visited Japan eleven times, but only once was formal in 1958, meanwhile the others were informal or meeting between Malaysia and Philippine’s leaders in framework of solving the lawsuit Indonesia-Malaysia. In the other years president Soekarno visited Japan more than once, in 1960 and 1961 President Sukarno visited Tokyo twice and three times in 1964. In those times, foreign minister Subandrio in President Sukarno’s government also visited Japan in high quantity. Between 1957 and 1965 Subandrio visited Japan twenty times.

The interested side from foreign visit of the Indonesian’s officials was many groups. The group of president Sukarno in its visits to Tokyo was big enough, from 13 people in 1958 until 61 people in 1964. These big groups got involved cabinet ministers like Subandrio, Leimena, Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX, Chairul Saleh, Ahmad Yani and A.H Nasution-sic Ministerd in 1960 and seven ministers in 1961. On the other hand, the group of Kishi in 1957 was consist of 13 people in visiting Indonesia. Most of President Sukarno’s journey was called “foreign rest”, but the fact was participated serious talking with the host state leaders, talked about Indonesian’s problem of Irian Barat and strengthened foreign politic of active-free in chances of normal state ceremony. The visit frequency of president Sukarno to Tokyo often was told as last stop
VISITS OF JAPANESE PRIME MINISTERS AND FOREIGN MINISTERS IN INDONESIA AND INDONESIAN PRESIDENT AND FOREIGN MINISTER IN JAPAN 1957-1966 (Masashi Nishihara 1976)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Official</th>
<th>Term of Office</th>
<th>Dates of Visits</th>
<th>Duration of Visits (days)</th>
<th>Size of Party (no. of persons)</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Japanese Prime Ministers</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Japanese Foreign Minister</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Fujiyama</td>
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<td>Nov.26-28, 1957</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Jan.19-23, 1958</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kosaka</td>
<td>1960-1962</td>
<td>No visit</td>
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<td>Shiina</td>
<td>1964-1966</td>
<td>Oc.25-28, 1966</td>
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<td><strong>Indonesian President</strong></td>
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<td>June 6-19, 1959</td>
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<td>May 24-June 3, 1960</td>
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<td>Sept.26-28, 1960</td>
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<td>35</td>
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<td>June 23-July 2, 1961</td>
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<td>Sept.18-21, 1961</td>
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<td>Nov.4-21, 1962</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Nov. 26-29, 1964</td>
<td>Feb. 11-14, 1965</td>
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*Data not available.*
from a long foreign rest”. In Japan, beside loving the food, drinking and Japan’s women, President Sukarno also held business with the government officials and the government officials and the important businessmen for Indonesian and held meeting back with friends in the war period. Between 1957 and 1964, President Sukarno spent 117 days in Japan, meanwhile Prime Minister Kishi and Ikeda only spent 6 days in Indonesian at the same period. Japan was only one country that was most often visited President Sukarno by the long staying time and also with big follower (Masashi Nishihara 1976) This condition couldn’t be denied, was intimacy sign.

THE IMPLEMENTATION OF WAR REPARATIONS PAYMENT

The Japan’s war reparations to Indonesian for $223.08 million, paid for twelve years in form of service and capital goods (Masashi Nishihara 1976). This thing drew the investor and politic leaders of two countries. Who saw big advantage possibility in projects with this reparations fund. The reparations fund which was planed $20 million/year in eleven years and the rest in this 12th year, the fact was the implementation experienced difficulty and incorrectness so some projects which were given fund with reparations fund canceled, didn’t finish or operate. This thing, one of causal aspect was the unefficiency of Indonesian’s government and domestic policy hindrance of Indonesia. But the payment timing was correct twelve years, 15 April 1958 until 14 April 1970.

The uncorrectness of war reparations payment can be explained here, example, the payment in fourth year increased over scheduled sum for $39.52 million, meanwhile the payment in fifth year decreased less from scheduled payment, although all sums were not over from scheduled sum. Indonesian’s government used reparations fund for big projects which spent biggest part from allocated annual funds, and in 1963 became clear for Japan that Indonesia’s foreign debts would must be pain / closed with reparations fund. The report of Japan’s government told that in 1964 the fund would have been over.

The biggest problem in war reparations payment came after December 1965 when Indonesia started to use reparations fund to pay the debts. This thing was one of difficulty that made disorder. After the war reparations agreement started to be valid, Indonesian decided for some development projects to be paid with the debts from Japan, separated from reparations fund. On 16th October 1959, after making discussion about one year. The
foreign minister of both countries, Fujiyama Aichiro and Subandrio arranged debt agreement and agreed that those debts would be returned in American Dollar. If Indonesian couldn’t repay those debts, would be cut from reparations fund. Between 1959 and 1963, Indonesian had borrowed four times for $81.7 million or $94.76 million with the interest. The debts which were bound with reparations fund technically were separated from reparations payment, but the programs overlapped each other financially. The payback of the debts started in August 1961 and still continued until November 1965, when coup d’e’tat experiment happened in September 1965 decreased foreign currency that was had Indonesian and impeded payback. Then the war reparations fund must have been used to cover and the debts that must be still finished. The impact, the biggest part from reparations programs still occurred, stopped or canceled.

The reparations fund which was agreed in 1958 would be used to pay six categories of program and project included: transportation and communication, electric power development, industry development, agricultural and fishery development, mining and service. For payment period 12 years, 26 big projects happened and were paid with reparation fund, although only some finished perfectly in last payment. 26 projects spent fund for $77.63 million or 35% from all reparations fund $223.08 million. The irrigation project of flood controller in East Java; paper factory in North Sumatera, South Kalimantan and South Sulawesi; textile factory in Bandung and Jakarta; and water power system in East Java. The most expensive project was a dam $19.237 million, that was built in Karang Kates in upper course of Brantas, East Java.

One of another project that was paid by reparations fund was program of education and training for Indonesian’s youth. Almost 100 students were sent to Japan every year started 1960 from five until seven years, education in university, and about 250 Indonesian’s youth went to Japan for two and half years in framework of training of authority and profession in private companies and government department. The totality was 500 students had been sent in five years and 1750 trained force in seven years. Under the personal contracts some Indonesian’s lecturers were given technical training to lead factories and other facilities were got into reparations projects. About 2.500 Indonesian people accepted training of technical or education under reparations agreement.
Some projects which were paid by separated debts from another reparations fund: four fabulous hotels in Jakarta, Pelabuhan Ratu, Yogyakarta and Bali; shopping center in Jakarta; Ship dock in Surabaya; the bridge of Sungai Musi in Palembang; paper factory in Banyuwangi East Java; and sixteen ships and ten beach patrol ships. But these some projects were combined with reparations project, example the development of some hotels and bridge of Sungai Musi in Palembang South Sumatera.

Although experiencing difficulty and problems in implementation of war reparations payment, example, the discorrectness of annual reparations sum and mixing reparations fund with the debts, but the reparations payment was exact for twelve years. This case could b seen as one of stability indication of relation between RI-Japan in the period.


Since the independence was given back in April 1952, Japan could focus on its attention to economy development because Japan’s security was guaranteed by USA through agreement of bilateral security land affairs. One of Japan’s security policy is firmly maintaining Japan- U.S. security arrangements that was signed in September 1951 (Kodansha International Ltd. 2002). Mentioned that Japan’s economy had started to be steady in last 1950’s and beginning 1960’s which was supported by domestic – and foreign factors. It couldn’t be denied that all powers which were in a state, include economy power, it had turn to obtain politic goal. The foreign policy of Japan’s period, like Akio Watanabe said (Robert A. Scalapino 1977):

“Until recently, efforts to get back what Japan lost in the war –independence, prosperity, honor, international position, and national self-confidence-have consistently formed the main theme of Japanese foreign policy”.

Meanwhile the realization from the foreign politic pressure was with “economy diplomacy”.

In the framework of economy diplomacy, Japan also had relation with Indonesian. Japan was really careful to maintain its relation with Indonesian, tried to avoid politic conflict as could as possible. But the relation of Indonesian-Japan has experienced tensions, although at last it, didn’t influence intimate relation of Indonesian-Japan. The
tensions occurred when the incident of “Karel Doorman” happened in 1960 and the incident of Netherland KLM’s flight concern in 1962, although since the Irian Barat’s campaign, Japan’s government took neutral attitude (Masashi Nishihara 1976).

In June 1960, Netherlands Ambassador in Tokyo asked permission to transit in Japan’s harbor for its war mother ship, Karel Doorman, for filling gasoline and water stock, in framework of Irian Barat’s defense. Indonesian’s embassy and Perhimpunan Pelajar Indonesia / PPI (Indonesian Student Federation) in Japan protested the plan of warship transit to Japan’s government. The protest of Indonesian got support from socialist party of Japan and Association of Japan-Indonesian that was lead by Tani Masayuki. On 3rd September, the warship Karel Doorman was informed to leave Irian Barat’s waters and went to Japan. Therefore, Japan’s socialist party protested and Indonesian threatened to break off economy relation with Japan. In the hard pressure, Foreign Minister Kosaka cancelled his decision, told that he didn’t want to trade Asia’s friend with a warship, finally, Netherland’s warship Karel Doorman was back to Holandia (now Jayapura) on 9th September (Masashi Nishihara 1976).

Another tension, a same incident happened in February 1962. On 30th January, Netherland’s flight concern KLM asked permission to Japan’s government to put ashore three airplane in Tokyo’s airport (brought 211 government staffs) in its journey to Biak, Irian Barat. Japan refused to give permission because it was afraid to cause new tension with Jakarta. Then on 3rd February, Netherland’s government took military staff with normal commercial flight KLM to Biak via Tokyo. Because Japan didn’t have legality to refuse so Japan tightened its security of embassy in Jakarta, the ambassador of USA in Jakarta was attacked when USA gave same permission to Netherland. Although Japan protested to Netherland’s government but Netherland’s government took more soldiers, with wearing civil, On 6th and 10th February. That occasion caused protest by PPI, and then they demonstrated to Nederland’s embassy in Tokyo. In Indoenesian, the same reaction happened, in Surabaya, Japan’s consulate office was thrown by stones. In Japan’s government, the tension happened and the protest that was done by communist party of Japan and also worry note that was informed by PPI. Nevertheless, Japan still felt that it couldn’t get way to prevent military transportation that was done by Netherland. Apparently, Netherland’s government was urged with Irian Barat’s problem, so finally on
5th March. Netherland’s foreign minister Joseph Luns told to Japan’s foreign minister that its government wouldn’t confuse Japan’s government longer and then the incident was over (Masashi Nishihara 1976).

From the two incident, in Indonesian, the impression came that Japan was inclined to take sides Netherland in Irian Barat’s problem, but Japan, apparently, put self more as neutral position. Apparently, the tension problem which happened between Indonesian and Japan could be forgotten because finally Indonesian won Irian Barat as integral part of Republik Indonesia.

The politic of NEFOS and OLDEFOS of President Sukarno (J.A.C. Mackie 1974), couldn’t put Indonesia in opposite position with the West; this politic was probably consistent from President Sukarno’s attitude which was very anti-imperialism and colonialism (Alfian 1978), so when Tengku Abdul Rahman planned a Federation of Malaysia which was sponsored by England and other West-countries, President Sukarno Refused it. Then this Indonesia-Malaysia conflict was known as “confrontation”(Nik Anuar Nik Mahmud 2009). The Confrontation ended after the failure of kup experiment by PKI and also threw President Sukarno from authority, even though in evolusioner, the authority fell to Letnan Jendral Suharto.

Japan’s anxiety about the effect of Indonesia-Malaysia conflict in Shout East Asia territory which was exceptionally beneficial to the Japan and its economic power which had started to be traded on, Japan tried to join in Indonesia-Malaysia conflict, even though it was not asked by party which had a legal dispute.

The first effort which was done by Japan was confronted President Sukarno with Tengku Abdul Rahman in Tokyo which was tried by Minister of Foreign Affairs Ohira Masayoshi by persuaded Minister of Foreign Affairs Indonesia Subandrio when on 24th May came to Tokyo. The meeting was held on 31th May until 1st June 1963 which reached the agreement to solve the conflict piececly and planned the core meeting for three countries Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippine. The core meeting was taken on 30th July until 5th August 1963 reached planning of federation establishment which was called Maphilindo and Tengku Abdul Rahman agreed the pending of independence proclamation federation until investigator team from UN announced the result. But, on 29th August, Rahman said that Federation day would be announced on 16th September before the result of UN investigator
team announced the result. The effect was Indonesia and Philippine didn’t recognize Malaysia federation which was published on 16th September 1963, even though on 14th September UN had extended the result that was the people of Sabah and north Kalimantan required to join with Malaysia, on 16th September Indonesia and Philippine also ended diplomatic relation with Malaysia. Indonesia - Malaysia confrontation became more tense. From 26 until 29 September 1963 Prime Ministry Japan Ikeda Hayato visited Indonesia. In the meeting with President Sukarno on 28 September, IKEDA forced President to take reasonable step in solving Malaysia trouble. Then on 12 Desember 1963 President Sukarno demanded PBB to do reinvestigation, but againsted by Rahman, situation became more tense and solving prospect more blur. So, this first effort of IKEDA had failed.

The Japan’s second effort in solving Indonesia - Malaysia conflict was done in January until June 1964. When President Soekarno was in Japan in his visit which always did in Januari 1964 same with attendance attorney general of America Robert Kennedy. on 17 January 1964, Attorney general Robert Kennedy, President Sukarno, Minister of Foreign Affair Japan Ohira Masayoshi and Prime Ministry Ikeda Hayato held meeting which reached the deal for solving the conflict piecely. This meeting didn’t make better because the leader of Malaysia has attitude to anti-Indonesia in campaign general election 25 April 1964, this condition was answered by Presiden Sukarno declaration about Malaysia would be destroyed in the last of 1964 (Suli Suleiman 1981). Beside that, Philippine, because of forced by America, changed its decision and made consular relation with Malaysia and offered to be the mediator in Indonesia-Malaysia conflict. Then the minister of Foreign Affairs Philippine Salvador Lopez tried the top meeting in Tokyo. In 20 June 1964 was held the top meeting between President Sukarno, President Macapagal and Prime Ministry Tengku Abdul Rahman in Tokyo. At the first, it had the deal to establish mediator commission four countries Asian-Africa, but next Tengku Abdul Rahman submited condition that was Indonesia should take back its troops from North Kalimantan in four weeks. That demand made President Sukarno went out of meeting and that meeting failed without the deal. Then this second effort failed.

The Japan’s third effort was done by Kawashima Sojiro as messenger cabinet government sato ei saku (Prime Minister IKEDA fell in November 1964) which held working visit in April 1964. Kawashima was succeed to make sure both President Sukarno
and Prime Minister Rahman to hold remeeting in Tokyo. But at the meeting time President Sukarno didn’t attend that meeting, so the meeting became failed. Then, this Japan’s effort also didn’t success.

The next effort, Kawashima Sojiro which understood the Japan’s position which still depended on USA, Japan started to think the new theme of its foreign politic with trying to make close relations with non-block countries. Because of that Japan decided to join in the Asia-Africa’s second conferention in Aljazair. In April 1965, Kawashima and Chou en Lai went to Jakarta to attend in that conferention. But in 19 June, there was coup d’etat in Aljazair to Benbella power which was pro Peking by anti communist military. Then the conferention was phosponed until the unsure time, beside that President Sukarno seemed closer with Chou en Lai. Then Kawashima visited to Indonesia to attend the invitation to celebrate the 20th independence day of Indonesia in 17th August 1965. Kawashima used this chance to solve Indonesia-Malaysia’s conflict, but it felt harder because it was against by power in Indonesia which was optimist and persevering would win this conflict, and President Sukarno said in speech that was Malaysia would be destroyed, even though Japan said to phospone its economic aid in the amount of $37 million. Kawashima made effort to be mediator was ended when the coup d’etat happened in Indonesia by PKI in 30th September 1965. This coup d’eta didn’t end Indonesia - Malaysia confrontation, this confrontation was ended in 11th August 1966 after the sign of Indonesia - Malaysia’s friendship agreement by Adam Malik and Tun Abdul Razak and without the 3rd party, even though before it had been held unofficial approach by Adam Malik, Shirahata and Kai Fumihiko (Masashi Nishihara 1976).

Even though finally the role of Japan mediator in Indonesia-Malaysia conflict was not needed, but in Japan’s antusiasm to involve itself as mediator role was enough to give the description about Japan which gave the big attention to Indonesia. And actually, this mediator role got reception, especially from Indonesia, which described the good relation between Indonesia and Japan, even though this two countries had the different politics line.
REFERENCE


